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感染预防控制最佳实践(双语)

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发表于 2013-10-5 12:14:00 | 显示全部楼层


这是我最近翻译的《Best Practices in Infection Prevention and Control》一书的一部分,现首发到论坛。这份资料可能对大家在医院评审中有所帮助。
在此感谢胡教授和楚楚老师向我推荐了这份资料。同时感谢我市感控中心主任欧阳育琪老师,在我翻译这份资料时所给予的指导,特别是其中有一部分是由他亲自翻译。



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上一篇:如何收集感控监测中的案例下一篇:您院传染病管理是由院感科负责还是由其他什么科室负责呢?





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发表于 2013-10-5 12:14:01 | 显示全部楼层


Best Practices in Infection Prevention and Control: 感染预防控制最佳实践Chapter One  Infection Prevention and Control第一章 感染预防控制A Global Perspective on a Health Care Crisis医疗服务危机的全球思考Infectious disease have been around for thousands of years wish resultant acute and chronic illnesses that have impacted human and animal health. Health professionals diagnose and treat infection and have attempted to reduce, if nor eliminate, infection risk. Infection prevention and control (IPC) strategies are critical to safe, high-quality health care via implementation of effective infrastructure and systems that identify, address, and prevent the spread of infections.感染性疾病已经存在数千年,所引起的急性与慢性疾病对人和动物的健康产生严重的影响。感染的危害是不可能消除的,但医务人员可通过对感染的诊断和分析,去努力减少感染的发生。感染预防控制(IPC)策略是通过建立有效的基础设施和识别、控制和预防感染蔓延的科学体系等手段来得到安全、高效的医疗保健服务。Health care-associated infections (HAIs) are infections that occur during the processes of health care delivery and are restricted to infections that were not present or incubating prior to the onset of care.1 These HAIs occur in patients who receive care in hospitals and other health care facilities and in health care professionals and staff who are identified with infections as a result of occupational exposures.1 There is increasing global concern and prioritization of HAIs as a patient-safety issue, particularly because these adverse events are associated with morbidity, if not mortality, and excess costs.2,3 Improved global communications have enhanced public awareness of health risks, infectious diseases, and HAI burden.4 Infections that have resulted in international headlines include, but are not limited to, viral infections from pandemic influenza H1N1 and West Nile virus, and bacterial infections from methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and multidrug-resistant (MDR) gram-negative organisms. From a global health perspective, effective IPC strategies for HAIs are readily applicable to preparedness plans and infrastructure for population health challenges, such as widespread epidemics, natural disasters, and bioterrorist threats.医院感染(HAIs)是指在接受医疗服务过程中发生的感染,而不是在接受医疗前已经存在或处于潜伏期的感染1。这些医院感染(HAIs)是指患者在医院或其他医疗保健机构接受治疗期间和医院医务人员或因职业暴露而发生的感染1。HAIs作为病人安全问题越来越引起全球的重点关注。特别是HAIs这些不良事件与发病率、死亡率、额外经济负担的增加密切相关2,3。加强全球交流,加大人们对健康危机、感染性疾病和医院感染负担的认识4。已成为国际社会热门话题的感染(且并不限于此)包括:从H1N1流感大流行到西尼罗河病毒(West Nile virus)所引起的病毒感染;从耐甲氧西林金黄色葡萄球菌(MRSA)到多重耐药(MDR)革兰阴性菌所引起的细菌感染。从全球卫生的角度思考,为医疗相关感染(HAIs)制定的感染预防控制措施也为人类健康面临的难题:如广泛的流行性疾病、自然灾害、生物恐怖威胁等提供了合适的实施计划和基础设施。






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发表于 2013-10-5 12:14:02 | 显示全部楼层


HAIs医院感染One of the primary responsibilities of care providers and health care organizations is to do no harm to the patient or to the health care worker (HCW).5 Yet health care delivery has inherent risks, the serious nature of HAIs is undeniable, and the safety risks for patients and providers are considerable. Care settings may be reservoirs for infections despite advanced technology, environmental health and cleanliness standards, and well-intentioned staff. There is increased pressure for health care organizations to do more with fewer resources, which creates strategic challenges amid treating increased numbers of patients over shorter inpatient stays, staffing shortages combined with ongoing staff training, lack of or limited supplies, and administrative requests to reduce costs. Historically, concern for HAIs has primarily been a focus only for hospitals. Now health care that traditionally was provided in hospitals has become increasingly provided in subacute and rehabilitation facilities, ambulatory clinics, other care areas, and the home. This shift in sites of care has heightened the risk of infection at all points along the care continuum, making IPC a priority in all health care settings.2,6 An abundance of challenges as opportunities exist for IPC strategies conducted by knowledgeable, well-trained health care epidemiologists (also called medical directors in some areas) and IPC professionals (also known as IPC practitioners or infection preventionists). The following sections discuss the components of the IPC crisis and identify some future challenges.预防保健和医疗保健机构的主要职责之一就是不伤害病人和医护人员5。然而,医疗保健服务工作具有内在的风险,医院感染的严重性不容否认,患者和医护人员的安全风险很大。尽管有先进的技术、好的环境卫生和清洁标准及优秀的服务人员,但医疗保健机构仍然可能是感染的疫源地。要求治疗的患者人数增多、住院时间的减少、医护人员的短缺、持续的员工培训、所需物资的有限或缺乏、行政要求降低成本等给建立有效的感染预防控制策略带来了挑战,医疗机构面临着要求做更多而资源相对缺乏的压力巨增。从历史上看,医院感染主要关注的重点是医院。医疗保健服务传统上是医院提供,现在越来越多的小型专科和康复机构、门诊诊所和其它的保健领域及家庭在提供医疗服务。这种转变使得感染风险在各类保健设施中持续地上升,感染预防控制(IPC)策略已成为各级医疗保健机构优先考虑的问题2,6。大量的挑战为知识渊博、训练有素的医疗保健流行病学家(在某些地区称为“医疗董事”)和IPC专业人员(又称IPC医生或感染预防学家)实施IPC战略带来了现实的机遇。下列章节讨论IPC危机和寻找未来可能出现的挑战。Infections pose a significant threat to patient safety, and organizations must work to minimize risk for HAIs and to mitigate adverse effects when prevention has not been achieved. A recent systematic review and meta-analysis reported that the burden of endemic HAIs—the normal or expected incidence of infections in a population—was higher in developing countries (pooled prevalence 15.5 per 100 patients, 95% confidence interval [CI] 12.6-18.9) than proportions reported from Europe and the United States (see Sidebar 1-1).7 Although it is true that some patients who acquire infections in a health care institution are frail, elderly, or immunocompromised, there are also many healthy people who enter hospitals or alternative care sites for elective procedures, fully expecting to return home in good health. When health care encounters include acquisition of infection, the consequences undoubtedly involve excess morbidity, if not mortality, and excess costs. Such infections include, but are not limited to, catheter-associated bloodstream infections (CABSIs), surgical site infections (SSIs), skin and soft tissue infections (SSTIs), and ventilator-associated bacterial pneumonia (VABP). The key criteria to addressing HAIs are early case detection and effective IPC strategies (see Sidebar 1-2).感染给病人安全构成重大威胁,在有效的预防措施没能完全实现之时,医院必须尽最大的努力降低医院感染的风险,以减轻不利影响。最近一个系统评价和meta-分析显示地方性医院感染的经济负担,来自发展中国家中人群正常或预期的感染发病率(患病率为15.5%, 95%置信区间[CI]为12.6-18.9)比例明显高于来自欧洲和美国的数据报道(见补充材料1-1)7。尽管一些病人在医疗保健机构获得感染的确是因他们自身的、年老或免疫力低下。也有许多正常人期待以良好的健康状况回家,有选择性地进入医院或其它医疗机构,然而在医疗过程中遭遇了感染,其后果是增加了新的发病率、死亡率和额外的医疗负担。这些感染包括(但不仅限于):导管相关血流感染(CABSIs)、手术部位感染(SSIs)、皮肤软组织感染(SSTIs)及呼吸机相关肺炎(VABP)。控制医院感染的关键是早期发现和实施有效的IPC策略(见补充材料1-2)。






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发表于 2013-10-5 12:14:03 | 显示全部楼层


The many reason that infections occur in a health care setting include发生医院感染的原因包括:●lack of infrastructure to support the IPC program, such as ineffective or absent leadership support, insufficient staffing levels, insufficient staff training about IPC, and lack of supplies;*●对IPC对策缺乏基础设施的支持:如对IPC策略,领导不支持或无能,人员编制不足,员工培训不到位,所需物资的短缺;** Joint Commission Internationl (JCI) defines leadership as an individual(s) who sets expectations, develops plans, and implements procedures to assess and to improve the quality of the organization’s governance, management, clinical, and support functions. This includes at least the leaders of the governing body; the chief executive officer and other senior managers; departmental leaders; the elected and the appointed leaders of the medical staff, the clinical departments, and other medical staff members in organizational administrative positions; and the nurse executive and other senior nursing leaders.* JCI(国际医疗卫生机构认证联合委员会)将领导力定义为一个(一些)个体,他能给你期望、制定计划、并通过实施程序来评估和改善组织的管理、临床以及支持部门的质量。这至少包括理事机构的领导、行政总裁和其他高级经理、部门领导、以及在管理岗位上当选和任命为领导的医务人员、临床科室和其他医务人员,还包括护理执行董事和其他高级护理管理人员。●inadequate hand hygiene and aseptic or sterile technique;●不适当的手卫生和净化消毒技术;●the emergence of MDR organisms due in part to the inappropriate use of antimicrobial agents;●出现多重耐药(MDR)病原体的部分原因是抗生素的不合理使用;●increasing number of immunocompromised patients;●免疫力低下病人数量的增多;●inappropriate or inadequate procedures and techniques of care;●医疗规程和技术的不适当与缺陷●ineffective cleaning and disinfection of the patient care environment or medical equipment; ●对病人护理环境和医疗设备无效的清洁或消毒●public health issues, such as contaminated water supplies, inadequate management of medical waste, and inadequate preparedness plans for natural disasters, bioterrorist threats, and bioterrorist events.●公共卫生事件:如水供应的污染,医疗废物管理不善,发生自然灾害计划、准备不充分,生物恐怖威胁和生物恐怖事件。






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发表于 2013-10-5 12:14:04 | 显示全部楼层


Sidebar1-1. the Global Burden of HAIs补充材料1-1. 医院感染的全球负担Estimates of HAIs vary widely, and a fragmented picture of the endemic burden of HAIs in developing countries, defined for lower- and middle-income countries, was recently published.1 As of 2010, only 23 of 147 developing countries (15.6%) had an operational national surveillance system for HAIs, and there were no published data on HAIs’ endemic burden from the majority (66%) of developing countries.1 When HAIs were reported from investigators in developing countries, almost half the published studies were related to SSIs, presumably because cases can be more easily defined and associated with the health care that was delivered. In Europe, annual estimates of HAIs have been associated with 16 million extra days of hospital stay and 37,000 attributable deaths.2 As assessment of HAIs includes the occupational health and safety of HCWs, the global preparedness and response to the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic in 2003 remains highly informative, given that between 20% and 60% of HCWs became infected with viruses during routine patient case.3最近的数据公布,对医院感染的评估是千差万别的,发展中国家,特别是中、低收入国家的医院感染地方负担常被描绘为一幅支裂破碎的画面1。迄至2010年,147个发展中国家中仅有23个国家(占15.6%)有国家监测系统。大多数,66%的发展中国家没有医院感染地方负担的数据公布1。来自发展中国家研究人员对医院感染的研究报道,有一大半研究与SSIs相关,大概是较易知道SSIs是与医疗操作相关的原因。在欧洲,因医院感染,每年估计造成增加1600万个额外住院日和3.7万患者的死亡。评估包括医护人员职业保健安全在内的医院感染,2003年全球防控和应对严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)流行的例子仍具有很好的教育意义,知道有20%~60%的医护人员在病区被病毒感染。References1.Allegranzi B, et al. Burden of endemic health-care associated infection in developing countries: Systematic review and meta-analysis. Lancet. 2011 Jan 15; 377(9761): 228-241.2.European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Annual Epidemiological Report on Communicable Diseases in Europe 2008. Report on the State of Communicable Diseases in EU and EEA/EFTA Countries. Stockholm: ECDC, 2008.3.Cherry, JD. The chronology of the 2002-2003 SARS mini pandemic. Paediatr Respir Rev. 2004 Dec; 5(4): 262-269.






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发表于 2013-10-5 12:14:05 | 显示全部楼层


Sidebar 1-2. Key Infection Prevention and Control Strategies to Minimize Risk For HAIs补充材料1-2. 降低医院感染风险预防控制策略的关键●Strong, supportive leadership●领导的重视和支持●Evidence-based hand-hygiene practices and policies●循证手卫生实践与策略●Antimicrobial stewardship●抗菌药物的管理                                                                                   ●Sufficient, well-trained staff●有效良好的员工培训●Surveillance for patterns of infections and a system to identify areas that need specific interventions●区域的感染监测和识别系统必须有具体的干预措施●Evidence-based infection risk-reduction strategies inclusive of HCW occupational health and safety1●降低感染风险的循证策略包括医护人员的职业保健安全Reference1.Deuffic-Burban S, et al. Blood-borne viruses in health care workers: Prevention and management. J Clin Virol. 2011 Sep; 52(1): 4-10.






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发表于 2013-10-5 12:14:06 | 显示全部楼层


Emerging and Reemerging Diseases Epidemics, and Bioterrorism新发与再度出现的疾病流行与生物恐怖主义When designing IPC programs to reduce risk of infections in health care settings, organizations must integrate community-based surveillance data and public awareness of infectious-disease threats. Many persons who acquire infections in the community must be seen in clinics, hospitalized, or cared for in the home by family or friends who have little to no training in IPC.8 Therefore, IPC professionals in health care organizations must incorporate and design strategies that permit uptake and diffusion of IPC into alternative care settings. Below is a discussion of infection clusters, epidemics, and pandemics, as well as selected emerging infectious diseases, blood-borne infections, and bioterrorist threats that are of global interest.在制定减少医疗保健机构感染风险的感染预防控制规程时,制定者必须结合考虑社区监测数据和公众对感染性疾病威胁的意识。许多人在社区获得感染,被几乎没接受过感染预防控制训练的家人或朋友送往诊所、医院或家庭护理机构8。因此,在医疗保健机构的IPC专业人员必须整合和制定其它保健机构能够容纳接受和推广的IPC策略。下面讨论的感染聚集、蔓延和流行,和新发感染性疾病、血流感染和生物恐怖威胁一样,是全球所关注的。Infection Clusters, Epidemics, and Pandemics感染的聚集、流行和大流行The majority of HAIs are endemic infections—normal or expected incidence of infections in a population—that occur on a continual basis and require ongoing attention to ensure low incidence and prevalence. Evidence-based recommendations to reduce or to prevent endemic HAIs and endorsed by the Society of Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) target CABSIs, CAUTIs, SSIs, and VABP.9-12 Periodically, health care organizations experience HAI clusters, if not outbreaks, also known as epidemic. Epidemics are a greater-than-expected number of infections in a given population during a defined period. Well-designed procedures and protocols are available to investigate these occurrences in a systematic manner, to determine the cause, and to quickly initiate interventions.13 System-based improvements and practices from one cluster or outbreak can be incorporated into strategies to prevent future untoward events and outbreaks.大多数医院感染是地方性感染――在人群中正常的或预期的感染率――这是一直存在的,需要持续关注,以确保低的发病率和患病率。循证建议降低或预防医院感染的流行,美国医疗保健流行病学会(SHEA)认同以CABSIs, CAUTIs, SSIs, and VABP作为目标9-12。医疗保健机构定期地经历医院感染的聚集,不称为暴发,也可称为流行。流行是在一时间段确定人口数量中比预期数量更大的人员发生感染。制定良好的规程和方案,对这些感染事件进行系统地调查,确定原因,并迅速启动干预措施13。基于一次感染聚集或暴发事件,进行系统地改进和实践,可纳入策略中,以防止未来的突发事件或暴发事件。Organizations must have appropriate IPC strategies in place should an outbreak attributed to an infectious etiology be identified or suspected in the community or a health care setting. Standardized practices and policies will minimize the potential interpersonal transmission of infection, optimize effective communication, and standardize reporting.14 During a crisis, there is typically insufficient time to educate health care professionals about the warning signs of certain diseases and the appropriate actions to undertake in order to minimize, if not to interrupt, the spread of transmissible infections. These challenges compel health care organizations to develop and to promote preparedness plans in advance of infection clusters, outbreaks (epidemics), and pandemics—epidemics that spread worldwide, or at least across a large region. This goal can be accomplished through a proactive and ongoing risk-assessment process. Practical tips on how to develop such IPC programs are further detailed in Chapters 5 and 6.在可能出现确定或怀疑由感染病原体引起暴发的社区或医疗保健机构必须有合适的IPC对策。符合标准的实践和策略将使人际间潜在的感染最小化,能强化有效沟通,进行准确地报告14。在紧要关头,通常没有足够的时间对医护专业人员就某些疾病来临的信号和使责任最小化的适当活动进行教育培训,如果不采取干预措施,将使感染的传播扩散。这些挑战迫使医疗保健机构在感染聚集、暴发(流行)及大流行----全球性的或大范围的流行扩散之前制定更有效的准备应对计划。通过积极和持续的风险评估,这个目标可以实现,进一步的详情见第5章和第6章,如何制定IPC规程的实用技巧。Exemplary preparedness plans were executed during the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic that occurred in many countries.15 The multicountry SARS epidemic was associated with transmission dynamics that began in a hotel, spread via global air travel, and subsequently resulted in patient-to-HCW transmission. As noted from the SARS epidemic, when epidemics occur, organizations at point-of-care sites must be prepared to respond rapidly, efficiently, and with transparency. Preparedness plans must include health care administrative support to rapidly create temporary isolation facilities, systems to restrict access to exposed HCWs, and plans to involve specialists to establish case definitions, to screen and to promptly identify cases, to provide for continuous monitoring to ensure adherence to optimal infection control practices, and to provide regular feedback to HCWs and health care administerators.14典型的准备应对计划在2003年多个国家发生严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)流行时被执行。多国的SARS疫情开始是在一酒店里传播,通过空气传播散布全球,随后导致病人与医护人员之间的传播15。根据SARS疫情的特点,每个医疗点的组织必须准备充分,应对迅速,有效,且要求透明化。防控计划必须包括医疗卫生行政部门的支持,迅速建立临时隔离措施,建立限制接近被暴露医护人员的制度,建立包括专家设立诊断标准、筛查及迅速确认病情的方案计划,连续监测提供确保最佳的感染控制措施,并定期提供反馈意见给医护人员和医疗卫生行政部门负责人。Most infectious diseases are not associated with pandemics. It is more common for a microorganism to infect a relatively small number of people in routine clinical care than for outbreaks to occur. In some cases, an infectious disease can spread rapidly and affect large populations on multiple continents.16 If left unchecked, such infections can become epidemics or pandemics. The severity of a pandemic depends on the organism’s virulence, how rapidly it is able to spread from population to population, resistance to available drug treatments, immunity within the population, and effectiveness of response efforts. The global impact of prior influenza pandemics has been informative yet devastating (see Sidebar 1-3 for more information on influenza pandemics).17许多感染性疾病不是由大流行引起。相对来说,小数量的人群在日常临床医疗中因微生物感染比暴发发生更普遍。在某种情况下,一种感染性疾病能迅速传播并在多个大陆影响一大群人16。如果不加以控制,这种感染可流行或变成大流行。疫情的严重程度处决于病原体的毒力,在人群中传播的速度如何,药物治疗的有效性,人群的免疫力,应对工作的有效性。先前流感大流行对全球的影响仍然具有教育意义(见补充材料1-3. 流感大流行的更多信息)17。






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Sidebar 1-3. Influenza pandemics补充材料1-3. 流感大流行Three types of influenza viruses infect humans: types A, B and C. Only influenza A has been associated with pandemics; influenza B viruses do not cause pandemics, and type C influenza viruses cause mild infection.感染人体的流感病毒有三类:甲型、乙型和丙型。仅甲型流感与大流行相关;乙型流感病毒不会引起大流行,丙型流感病毒仅引起轻微感染。Historical Perspective历史视角The 1918-1919 Spanish influenza pandemic was due to the emergence of H1N1 in humans and resulted in an estimate 50 million deaths worldwide. 1 The 1957-1958 Asian influence pandemic was due to the emergence of H2N2 in humans and associated with more than 1 million deaths worldwide; this virus no longer circulates in humans. The 1968-1969 Hong Kong influenza pandemic, due to H3N2, was associated will an estimated 34,000 excess deaths in the United States. 2 H3N2 viruses continue to circulate worldwide and have been associated with tremendous morbidity and mortality.1918年至1919年西班牙发生H1N1病毒引起的人类流感大流行导致全球大约500万人死亡1。1957年至1958年亚洲发生由H2N2病毒引起的人类流感大流行导致全球超过10万人的死亡; 这个病毒在人类没引起再次循环。1968年至1969年香港流感大流行。由于H3N2病毒的流行,在美国估计超过有34000人死亡。H3N2病毒继续在全球传播,造成巨大的发病率和死亡率。Recent Influenza Epidemiology最新流感流行病学进展The natural reservoirs for new human influenza A virus subtypes are wild aquatic waterfowl, ducks, and geese. Since 2003 the transmission dynamics of avian influenza viruses have involved complex, rapid viral exchange of highly virulent virus in poultry flocks, with infection among humans in Azerbaijan, Cambodia, China, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam.3水生水禽、鸭、鹅是人类新型甲型流感病毒亚型的天然储存库。自2003年以来,禽流感病毒的传播涉及到复杂的感染流行动力学体系,高度恶性的病毒在家禽中快速传播。在阿赛拜疆、柬埔寨、中国、吉布提、埃及、印度尼西亚、伊拉克、泰国、土耳其和越南之间引起人类的感染3。Minor viral mutations evolve through a process called antigenic drift, which drives seasonal epidemics. But antigenic shift results from the replacement of the hemagglutinin (HA) and sometime the neuroaminidase (NA), with novel subtypes that have not been present in human viruses for a long time. The introduction of new HA into human viruses usually results in a pandemic. The reemergence of avian influenza A (H5N1) in 2003, together with seasonal influenza vaccine shortages throughout the world, has heightened awareness of the unmet needs related to pandemic preparedness plans. The global response to the 2009 pandemic influenza A H1N1 exemplified well-coordinated IPC strategies and effective response plans at the international, federal, state, local, and community levels.微小病毒突变演变的过程叫抗原漂移,病毒的抗原漂移驱使着季节性的流行。血凝素(HA),有时是神经氨酸酶(NH)的点突变导致病毒的抗原漂移,很长一段时间,人类病毒没有出现新的亚型。新的HA介入人类病毒通常引起大流行。2003年再度出现甲型禽流感(H5N1),加之世界各地季节性流感疫苗的短缺,加剧了应对大流行相关准备计划未满足需求的认识。全球应对2009年H1N1甲型流感大流行是IPC策略与有效的国际、联邦、州、地区和社区应对计划良好协调的典范。Relevance to IPCIPC的实用性Influenza pandemics evolve quickly, take an immense human toll, and have tremendous social and economic consequences. Early case detection, effective IPC strategies, and global communication efforts are relevant to minimizing risk of a future viral pandemic. The UC Centers for Disease control and prevention (US CDC) estimates that another influenza pandemic could cause up to 7.4 million human deaths worldwide and excess health care utilization in outpatient visits and hospital admissions.3 Risk of human-to-human transmission of influenza A H5N1 was explored in two studies, neither of confirmed transmission to HCWs exposed to confirmed and probable cases with H5N1 infection.4,5 WHO published interim IPC recommendations for suspected H5N1 patients in 2004 and updated them in 2006.6 Full barrier precautions are recommended, when possible, in provision of care for suspected of confirmed avian influenza patients with close patient contact and during aerosol generating procedures. Such precautions are defined as standard, contact, and airborne precautions inclusive of eye protection. Because some elements of full barrier precautions (particularly airborne precautions) may not be available in all health care facilities, minimal requirements for caring for H5N1 patients should include standard, contact, and droplet precautions. In addition, active surveillance for viral infection in HCWs and annual influenza vaccination of HCWs is recommended to potentially reduce the risk of coinfection with H5N1 and human influenza A viruses and to reduce the risk of viral reassortment.流感大流行快速传播,带来巨大的人员伤亡,且给社会和经济造成极大的影响。早期检测,有效的IPC策略及全球性的良好沟通能使未来的病毒大流行风险最小化。美国疾病预防控制中心(CDC)估计,另一次流感大流行可能导致世界各地多达740万人口死亡和占有过量的门诊、住院医疗保健利用率3。两项探讨人类H5N1甲型流感病毒在人与人之间传播风险的研究认为,医护人员暴露在感染H5N1确诊病例或疑似病人的情况下,两者都不能确认传播4,5。2004年世界卫生组织(WHO)公布了对疑似H5N1患者临时的IPC建议,并于2006年进行了更新6。在有气溶胶产生的情况下,有必要为保护禽流感疑似患者与患者的密切接触,建议实行全屏障预防措施。这些预防措施被定义为标准、接触、和空气传播中的预防措施,包括对眼睛的保护。因为全屏障预防措施中的一些内容(特别是空气传播的预防措施)可能无法使用所有的医疗设施。护理H5N1患者的最低要求应包括标准、接触及飞沫传播的预防措施。此外,积极监测病毒感染的医护人员,建议对医护人员每年接种流感疫苗,降低同时感染H5N1禽流感和人类甲型流感的潜在风险,同时也减少了病毒基因重组的风险。References参考文献1.Taubenberger JK. Morens DM. 1918 influenza: The mother of all pandemics. Emerg Infect Dis. 2006 Jan; 12(1): 15-222. Pan American Health Organization. Hurrying toward disaster? Peters C. 23 Aug 2002. Accessed 7 Oct 2011. http:// www.paho.org/common/Display.asp?Lang=E&ReclD=46093.World Health Organization. Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Reported to WHO, 2003-2011. 10 Oct 2011. Accessed 7 Oct 2011. http:// www.who. int/influenza/human_animal_interface/ EN_GIP_LatestCumulativeNumberH5N1cases.pdf.4. Apisarnthanarak A, et al. Seroprevalence of anti-H5 antibody among Thai health care workers after exposure to avian influenza (H5N1) in a tertiary care center. Clin Infect Dis. 2005 Jan 15;40(2):e 16-18.5. Liem NT, Lim W, Would Health Organization International Avian Influenza Investigation Team, Vietnam. Lack of H5N1 avian influenza transmission to hospital employees, Hanoi, 2004. Emerg Infect Dis. 2005 Feb;11(2):210-215.6. World Health Organization. Avian Influenza. (Updated Apr 2011) Accessed 14 Sep 2011. http://www.who.int/ mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/.






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发表于 2013-10-5 12:14:08 | 显示全部楼层


Emerging Infectious Diseases新发感染性疾病Since 1973 more than 30 new diseases have been characterized that have either viral or bacterial etiologies.18 Infectious diseases now comprise a mix of acute and chronic infections, and rapid transmission of infections has been further expedited by global travel. The emergence and spread of West Nile virus (WNV) infections in 1994-1999, the worldwide pandemic influenza A (H1N1) in 2009-2010, the ongoing emergence and global spread of MDR bacterial infections, and MDR tuberculosis portray how infectious diseases continue to thrive, how new strains emerge, and how dissemination occurs.19 These diseases highlight the importance of vigilance, preparedness plans, early case identification, and open communication, which together contribute to effective IPC and preserve patient safety in community and health care-delivery setting.自1973年以来,出现30多种以病毒或细菌病原体为特征的新疾病18。新的感染性疾病由急性和慢性感染混合而产生,感染传播迅速,加速了全球化传播的步伐。1994年至1999年西尼罗河病毒(WNV)出现和传播,2009年至2010年H1N1甲型流感全世界性的大流行,多重耐药菌感染不间断地出现造成全球性传播,多重耐药结核病的出现使感染性疾病越演越烈,新菌株不断出现,传播迅速重现19。这些疾病凸显了警觉、防控计划、早期识别和开放交流的重要性,有助于与有效的IPC策略联系在一起,保护好社区和医疗保健机构中病人的安全。West Nile Virus (WNV)西尼罗河病毒WNV has now been reported in most regions of the world. Outbreaks of WNV encephalitis in human occurred in Algeria in 1994, Romania in 1996-1997, the Czech Republic in 1997, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998, Russia in 1999, Israel in 2000, and the United States in 1999-2003.20 The US public health experience with the emergence, monitoring, and control strategies for WNV illustrates the importance of strong communication networks and coordinated collection of information not only between health care organizations and government agencies but also among physicians, veterinarians, public health providers, and wildlife experts. Sharing of information and transparent data collection can help enhance case detection, optimize clinical decision making, and contribute to disruption of viral transmission.西尼罗河病毒现在已经被世界多个地区报道。1994年阿尔及利亚、1996年至1997年罗马尼亚、1997年捷克共和国、1998年刚果共和国、1999年俄罗斯、2000年以色列、1999年至2003年美国发生人类WNV脑炎暴发20。美国公共卫生部门对WNV的出现、监测和控制策略的经验,说明加强通信网络联系和协作收集信息,不仅对医疗保健机构和政府机构,而且对医生、兽医、公共卫生服务人员和野生动物专家也是非常重要的。信息共享和资料收集的透明化,有助于加速对事件的判断,优化临床的决策,有助于阻止病毒的传播。The Pandemic Influenza—A H1N1H1N1甲型流感的大流行The 2009 pandemic influenza A H1N1 was first detected in Mexico in late March 2009, followed by prompt case detection in the United States and other countries. This virus was a unique combination of six influenza virus genes never previously identified in animals or humans. 21 There was triple-reassortant of North American swine virus lineages and two genes encoding neuraminidase and matrix proteins from Eurasian swine virus lineages. 222009年H1N1甲型流感的大流行最早发生在墨西哥2009年3月下旬,然后迅速地出现在美国和其他国家。这是一种独特的由6种流感病毒基因组合先前没有在动物和人类中出现过的病毒21。是来自北美猪病毒谱系与来自欧亚猪病毒谱系的神经氨酸苷酶和基质蛋白两个基因编码的三方基因重组的病毒22。After the initial case detection, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the 2009 influenza A H1N1 outbreak a public health emergency of international concern, raising the level of influenza pandemic alert from phase 3 to phase 4, and recommended that countries intensify surveillance for unusual outbreaks of influenza-like illness and severe pneumonia. In June 2009 WHO signaled that a global pandemic of 2009 influenza A H1N1 was under way by further raising the worldwide pandemic alert level to phase 6.23-25 The global pandemic was associated with millions of case infections, more than 19,000 deaths, and several million dollars in health care expenditures.最初病例发现后,世界卫生组织公布2009年H1N1甲型流感暴发是世界关注的公共卫生事件,提升流感大流行警报级别从3级升为4级,建议这些国家对不寻常的流感样疾病和严重肺炎加强监测。2009年6月世界卫生组织发出2009年H1N1甲型流感正在全球性大流行,进一步提升全世界大流行警报级别到6级23-25。全球大流行是与上百万人数的感染,19000多人死亡,几百万美元的医疗保健支出联系在一起的。The mechanisms of person-to-person transmission of the 2009 H1N1 virus appeared similar to those of seasonal influenza, but the relative contributions of small-particle aerosols, large droplets, and fomites are uncertain.22 Rates of secondary outbreaks of illness varied according to the setting and the exposed population, yet estimates ranged from 4% to 28%.23 Household transmission was highest among children and lowest among adults over 50 years of age.232009年的H1N1病毒人传人的传播机制与那些季节性的流感相似,但其小颗粒气溶胶、大的飞沫、污染物的相对作用是不确定的22。继发疾病的暴发率根据环境和暴露人群的不同而变化,但估计变化范围在4%到28%之间23。家庭传播以儿童和年龄超过50岁的成年人为最高23。WHO announced the end of the pandemic period in August 2010. 23 The 2009 pandemic influenza A H1N1 occurred against a backdrop of pandemic response planning after years of developing, refining, and regularly exercising preparedness response plans at the international, federal, state, local, and community level.26 This emergent disease was a major challenge for health care institutions and HCWs, particularly health care epidemiologists and IPC professionals who invested significant resources to control the pandemic.2010年8月,世界卫生组织宣传这次大流行结束23。2009年H1N1甲型流感发生在经过多年的发展,对流感大流行有应急措施和国际、联邦、州、地区和社区有不断改善,定期训练作好准备的应急计划的背景下26。这次突发的疾病是对医疗保健体系和医务人员的重大挑战,特别是为控制大流行付出巨大精力的医疗保健流行病学家和感染预防控制专业人员。Community-Associated MRSA社区相关MRSAStaphylococcus aureus is an important cause of infections in health care settings and in communities. MRSA results from the production of an alternate penicillin-binding protein, PBP2a, which has a low affinity for all β-lactam agents and generates resistant susceptible only to other antibiotic families, such as glycopeptides. Clinical isolates of MRSA were increasingly reported in the 1980s among patients primarily in hospitals and other health care environments. Since the mid- to late 1990s, however, there has been an explosion in the number of MRSA infections reported in persons lacking exposure to health care systems. These infections have been linked to MRSA clones known as community-associated MRSA (CA-MRSA).27 Strains of CA-MRSA differ in phenotype from the older, health care-associated MRSA (HA-MRSA) strains and carry a smaller, more mobile, and less physiologically burdensome chromosomal element, termed SCCmec type IV. This genetic element usually carries only the mecA gene, with no other resistance determinants, differentiating it from genetic elements traditionally found in HA-MRSA strains. 27 These CA-MRSA strains, often spread among healthy people in the community, and have been associated with severe skin and respiratory infections. 28金黄色葡萄球菌是引起医疗保健机构和社区感染的一个重要原因。MRSA产生一种能替代青霉素结合蛋白(PBP)的物质PBP2a, 降低其与β-内酰胺类药物的亲和力,产生耐药性,仅对其他种类的抗菌药物敏感,如糖肽类药物。上世纪80年代,越来越多的报道,在医院和其他医疗环境的患者中,从临床上分离出MRSA菌株。然而,从上世纪90年代中期以来,报道没有医疗保健环境暴露的经历者,感染MRSA的数量巨增。这种感染把MRSA克隆体与社区相关MRSA(CA-MRSA)联系起来27。CA-MRSA菌株在表型上不同于旧的、医疗相关MRSA (HA-MRSA)菌株,携带一个较小的、游离的、很少生理负担的染色体质粒,称作SCCmec IV型。这种遗传因子通常只携带mecA基因,没有其他耐药因子,将它与传统上HA-MRSA菌株能找到的遗传因子区分开来27。这些CA-MRSA菌株常常在社区健康人群传播,与严重的皮肤和呼吸道感染相关28。MDR Gram-Negative Pathogens多重耐药的革兰阴性病原菌Infections caused by MDR gram-negative pathogens are an increasing problem worldwide. Resistance dramatically limits therapeutic options, and, in contrast to new drugs for gram-positive organisms, there has been a paucity of new antimicrobial agents approved for gram-negative bacilli (GNB) in recent years. 29 Furthermore, many GNB are resistant to multiple agents and in some instances are pan-resistant to all commercially available antimicrobial agents.30 Notably, carbapenemases are categorized by hydrolytic mechanisms that permit drug resistance and include β-lactamases in the molecular Class A, B, and D. Epidemiological investing suggests complex and differential patterns of emergence of carbapenem-resistant bacteria. As an example, introduction of the plasmid-mediated Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) gene into several geographic regions has been due to intercountry patient transfer. Israel was the first nation outside the United States to report a large outbreak of KPC-producing K. pneumoniae attributed to health care-associated transmission of a strain linked to North America.31 Greece later identified wide-spread clonal KPC pathogens that were indistinguishable from contemporary Israeli clones. 32 In Germany, the likely index case in a single-center outbreak was a patient who had been previously hospitalized in Greece. 33 The Unite Kingdom, France, and other countries have also reported episodes of colonization or infection of patients with KPC pathogens transferred from endemic countries. For additional case studies and outbreaks of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae (CRKP) see Chapter 5 (Case Study 5-9) and Chapter 6 (Case Study 6-2).由多重耐药革兰阴性病原菌引起的感染是世界范围内日益严重的问题。耐药性大大限制了治疗方案。相反,对革兰阴性菌的新药物,近年来,一直缺乏新批准的抗菌药物应对革兰阴性菌29。而且,许多革兰阴性菌是多耐药的,甚至在某些情况下对市场上销售的抗菌药物是泛耐药的30。值得注意的是,碳青霉烯酶依据其水解机理分类产生耐药性物质,包括Ambler分子结构分类中的A、B和D类β-内酰胺酶。流行病学家对耐碳青霉烯类菌的出现提出了复杂的和不同的模型。例如:质粒介导的产碳青霉烯酶肺炎克雷伯菌(KPC)基因在几个不同地区出现是由病人跨国旅行传播的结果。以色列是除美国之外第一个报告由KPC引起克雷伯菌肺炎大暴发的国家,被认为与一个在北美医疗保健相关机构传播着的菌株有关31。希腊后来鉴别出的广泛传播的KPC病原克隆体与同时在以色列出现的克隆体没有区别32。在德国,在一家医疗中心暴发的病案检索中发现有病人可能先前在希腊的医院住过院33。英国、法国和其他国家也报告过从流行国家转移过来的KPC定植或感染病人的情况。更多的案例研究和耐碳青霉烯类克雷伯肺炎(CRKP)暴发情况见第5章(案例研究5-9)和第6章(案例研究6-2)。New Delhi metallo-β-lactamases (NDM) is a plasmid-mediated, class B metallo-β-lactamases that has been identified in a broad range of enterobacteriaceae and non-enterobacteriaceae. Isolates are resistant to carbapenems, aminoglycosides, fluoroquinolones, and most antimicrobial drug classes. Of concern, some isolates have also exhibited resistance to tigecycline and colistin. The index case with an NDM-producing pathogen was a man in Sweden who previously received health care in India.34 Subsequent case report and case series suggest health care contact in India, Bangladesh, and some Balkan nations has been associated with case detection in the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, and several European nations.35,36 These epidemicological observations require further elucidation but highlight the potential risk of intercountry transmission of MDN GNB.从广泛的肠杆菌科和非肠杆菌科中鉴别出新德里金属β内酰胺酶(NDM)是一种质粒介导的B类金属β内酰胺酶。分离出的菌株耐碳青霉烯类、氨基糖苷类、氟喹诺酮类等多类抗菌药物。更重要的是,一些分离菌株还耐替加环素和粘菌素。检索到的产NDM病原体的瑞典人曾在印度接受过治疗。后来的病例报告及在印度、孟加拉国和巴尔干国家进行过医疗的系列病例发现与在美国、澳大利亚、加拿大和欧洲几个国家检测的病例有关联35,36。流行病学家观察提出需进一步突出阐明MDN GNB在国家间传播的潜在危险。Tuberculosis结核病Tuberculosis (TB) is the most common infectious disease worldwide. It affects one third of the global population and is the leading cause of death from a potentially curable infectious disease. The 2009 global estimate for TB was 9.4 million incident cases (range 8.9-9.9), for a rate of 137 cases per 100,000 population (range 131-145).37 TB rate vary widely by geographic region, with 22 low- and middle-income countries accounting for more than 80% of active TB case worldwide.38 Prevalence rates of TB are highest in Africa and lowest in the Americas and Europe due to the high prevalence of HIV in some African countries and the effect of HIV on susceptibility to TB. 38 Case infection with MCR-TB is defined as a person with Mycobacterium tuberculosis resistant to at least two antitubercular drugs—isoniazid and rifampicin. Recent surveillance data have revealed that prevalence of MCR-TB has risen to the highest rate ever recorded worldwide. 38 The MCR-TB strain generally arises through the selection of resistance mutations that emerge during inadequate treatment. Prior TB treatment, shortage of α-tuberculous drugs, and treatment costs have been the most common reason for the inadequacy of the initial anti-TB regimen.39 Other factors that play an important role in the development of MDR-TB include limited administrative control of purchase and distribution of the drugs, inadequate mechanism for quality control and bioavailability tests, poor patient follow-up, and inadequate administrative infrastructure.结核病是世界范围内最常见的感染性疾病。影响着全世界三分之一的人口,导致一些可治愈的感染性疾病患者死亡。2009年估计有940万(890万-990万之间)人感染结核,比率为10万分之137(131-145之间) 37。结核的比率在各个地理区域变化很大,在22个低、中收入国家中占有全世界超过80%的活动性结核病患者。结核病的患病率在非洲最高,在美国和欧洲最低,因为非洲一些国家是艾滋病的高发地区,而结核对艾滋病很敏感38。多重耐药结核(MCR-TB)感染定义为一个结核分枝杆菌感染者至少对两种抗结核药----异烟肼和利福平耐药。最近的监测数据显示多重耐药结核(MCR-TB)流行的比率上升到最高,超过了全世界曾有的记录38。多重耐药结核(MCR-TB)菌株通常出现在选择不适当的治疗时发生耐药性突变。先前对结核病的治疗,缺少α-结核药物,初始抗结核疗法,治疗费用不足是一个最常见的原因39。促使MDR-TB发展迅速的另一些重要原因是政府限制这些药物的购买和分配,质量控制和生物利用度测试机制不健全,病人随访太少,管理基础设施不足。Many other infectious diseases not discussed above (for example, cholera, meningococcal disease, and dengue hemorrhagic fever) present ongoing challenges to IPC worldwide. Regional IPC strategies should focus on the infections prevalent in the geographic setting and include preparedness plans that can be implemented should an emerging infectious pathogen or outbreak occur.许多其他的感染性疾病(如霍乱、流脑、登革出血热)对世界各地感染预防控制的挑战不再讨论。地方的IPC策略将关注地方普遍流行的感染问题,包括对新发感染病原体或发生暴发实施应对方案。Occupational Risk for Blood-Borne Pathogens血源性病原体的职业风险Twenty-six different viruses have been reported as occupational transmission risks to HCWs.17 The majority of occupational health-related cases are due to one of three viruses—hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). In the year 2000, incident HCW infections worldwide due to percutanous injuries were estimated to be 16,000 for HCV, 66,000 for HBV, and 1,000 for HIV.40 The highest proportion of blood-borne viral transmission occurs through percutaneous injuries with hollow-bore needles for vascular access, although post-exposure risk of infections to HCVs also exists for splashes of blood to skin and mucous membranes.17 Pathogen-specific postexposure risk related to percutaneous injuries is estimated to be 30% for HBV in susceptive HCWs without post-exposure prophylaxis or adequate HBV vaccination, 0.5% after viremic HCV exposure, and less than 0.3% for HIV. 17对医务人员造成职业传播危害的有26种病毒17。与职业保健相关的主要的有三种病毒—乙肝病毒(HBV)、丙肝病毒(HCV)、人类免疫缺陷病毒(HIV)。在2000年,世界各地医务人员因皮肤损伤造成发生感染事件中,16000余人感染HCV,66000余人感染HBV,1000余人感染HIV40。通过空心针孔划伤皮肤暴露的血源性病毒传播引起的感染占的比例最高,虽然接触HIV病人因溅血经皮肤粘膜暴露引起的感染也存在17。对特殊病原体因皮肤损伤的暴露估计,医务人员30%HBV感染是暴露后没有采取预防措施,或没有接种HBV疫苗,0.5%HCV暴露者引起病毒血症,不到0.3%的感染HIV17。From a historical perspective, WHO first established the Safe Injection Global Network in 1989 as an international alliance of all organizations concerned with achieving safer use of injections. Current standard precautions and preventive methods to minimize risk for blood-borne pathogens include hand hygiene, use of barrier methods, minimal manual manipulation of sharp instruments and devices, proper disposal of sharp instruments and devices in specific resistant containers, and occupational health and safety programs that promote HCW vaccination and the reporting of percutaneous injuries. Regular and renewed training sessions are relevant to new and long-term HCWs, students, physician trainees, and physician. A prospective active surveillance program has recently reported lower rates of percutaneous injuries at a large teaching hospital in Saudi Arabia relative to the United States Exposure Prevention Information Network.41 Improved practices and decreased occupational exposure have been associated with safety training compliance and with safety-engineered devices, such as retractable syringes, needle-free intravenous systems, and winged butterfly needles. In addition, reuse of cheap single-use devices (such as needles, syringes, and surgical gloves) remains common in several resource-limited health care settings, leading to large numbers of preventable infections and opportunities for implementation of effective IPC strategies to minimize risk for HBV, HCV, HIV, and other blood-borne infections.42,43历史观察,世界卫生组织作为关心实现使用安全注射的国际联盟组织在1989年首次建立了安全注射全球网。当前,减少血源性病原体风险的标准预防措施和方法包括:手部卫生,使用屏障方法,对锐利器械和设备减少手动操作,锐利器械和设备中特定容器的妥善管理,促使医务人员疫苗接种和皮肤损伤报告的职业保健和安全规程。对新、老医务人员、学生、实习医生、医生定期和重新培训。一个潜在的积极监测项目是最近报道在与美国职业暴露预防信息网相连的一所沙特阿拉伯大型教学医院中皮肤损伤率在下降41。改进措施,减少职业暴露已经与安全法规培训和安全工程设备,如可回缩注射器、无针静脉系统、蝴蝶翼针等相关。另外,便宜的一次性使用的设备(如针头、注射器、外科手套)仍然普遍在一些资源的医疗保健机构重复使用,导致了大量可预防的感染,影响了降低HBV、HCV、HIV和其他血源性感染风险的有效感染预防控制策略实施的机会。Report of HCW-to patient transmission of HBV, HCV, and HIV exist. Although uncommon, patients with blood-exposure to HCWs with HBV, HCV, or HIV should systematically receive the same postexposure assessment and management as HCW protocols.报告医务人员传播HBV、HCV、HIV给病人也存在。尽管不常见,病人因血源暴露从医务人员间获得HBV、HCV、HIV,也将系统地接受暴露后的评估,同医务人员暴露后同样的管理。HIV/AIDS人类免疫缺陷病毒与获得性免疫缺陷综合征Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) has no cultural, social, or economic boundaries. According to a joint international program of the United Nations and WHO, as of 2009, an estimated 49.2 million people worldwide living with HIV, 2.6 million of whom were infected in 2009. 44 Form a historical perspective, the term AIDS was first used in 1982, when public health officials reported the occurrence of opportunistic infections in otherwise healthy people. Public fear, international distrust, and limited understanding of the of the natural history of disease, disease progression, and the transmission dynamics led to delays in identification of the viral etiology until 1985, when there was global consensus that a pandemic attributed to HIV infection resulted in AIDS. 44 In the United Stated and elsewhere, AIDS was initially identified in men who had sex with men, and subsequent case detection expanded to include women, injecting drug users, hemophiliacs, newborns, and unscreened blood supplies. Unsafe injection practices, unprotected sex, and the unnecessary use of injections in resource-limited setting continue to contribute to the burden of preventable HIV infection. Initial and ongoing training of HCWs regarding occupational risk for HIV infection and effective IPC strategies to minimize risk of blood-borne infection remains a key component of a sustainable and safe health care environment.获得性免疫缺陷综合征(AIDS)没有文化、社会、经济的界限。根据联合国和世界卫生组织一项联合的国际项目,截至2009年,估计世界各地生活着4920万HIV携带者,2009年有260万人口被感染HIV44。根据一项历史观察,术语AIDS最早使用于1982年。当时公共卫生官员报告在其他方面健康的人群发生机会性感染。公众害怕,国际不信任,对疾病的自然史、疾病进展、传播动力学了解极为有限,直至延迟到1985年病毒的病原学被识别,全球才一直普遍认为AIDS是HIV感染的结果44。在美国和其他地方,AIDS最初在男性同性***者中辨别出来,随后的情况发现扩展到妇女、注射吸毒者、血友病患者、新生儿、未经筛查的献血者。不安全注射行为、不安全性行为、在资源有限的机构继续进行不必要的注射增加了预防HIV感染的负担。自始至终对医务人员进行不间断的HIV感染职业风险教育培训,营造一个持续安全的医疗保健环境是把血源性感染风险降到最低有效的感染预防控制策略措施的关键。Bioterrorism生物恐怖主义Release, or threats of release, of biological agents or materials as weapons of mass destruction has the potential to evoke widespread public fear and panic, human injury, and destruction of physical plant structures. The health care community in each country must work closely with public health officials, law enforcement, and the military to ensure public safety related to deliberate epidemics and bioterrorism.45 A significant challenge in preparing for a potential bioterrorism event is anticipating the nature of the event and predicting what IPC issues will come up. The type of organism, the location of the release, the composition of the infected population, and the use of health care organizations by infected people to get treatment will influence how the specific events of a bioterrorist act unfold. Although a multitude of potential bioterrorism agents exists, following is a brief discussion of anthrax and smallpox, two pathogens that have received major media attention over the past decade. Suggestions regarding how to facilitate communication and prompt response to a biological emergency appear in Chapter 5.释放或威胁释放作为大规模杀伤武器的生物制剂或材料,可能引起公众的恐惧和恐慌,人类的伤害,动植物毁灭性的破坏。面对蓄意传播杀伤性生物武器和生物恐怖主义,各国的医疗服务团体要密切配合公共卫生官员,严格执法,军队要确保公众的安全45。准备面对潜在的生物恐怖主义严峻挑战时,要预先考虑事件的本质,确定制定感染预防控制方案要讨论的问题。受生物恐怖主义事件影响的因素很多,包括生物种类,释放的地理位置,受感染人群的组成,受感染人群寻求帮助的医疗服务机构等。尽管存在多种潜在的生物恐怖主义制剂,下面简要讨论炭疽和天花,在过去十年里,这两种病原体广泛受到主要媒体的关注。对出现生物突发紧急事件如何进行交流和迅速应对的有关建议见第5章。Anthrax炭疽Anthrax infection occurs after direct exposure to Bacillus anthracis spores, not after direct person-to-person contact. In a bioterrorism event, it is most likely that only the individuals coming in contact with spores would be affected. However, massive air-borne dissemination of B. anthracis spores could prove catastrophic if early identification and a rapid response does not occur. If untreated, the clinical progression of anthrax includes septicemia, meningitis, and death. In persons exposed to anthrax, infection can be prevented with antibiotic prophylaxis therapy; early antibiotic treatment can also help increase a person’s chance of survival.45 Early identification of an anthrax bioterrorist attack would lead to rapid antimicrobial distribution and containment, improved case detection, and heightened surveillance.炭疽感染发生于直接接触炭疽杆菌孢子后,而不是人与人之间的直接传播。在生物恐怖事件中,最可能的只是人直接接触到孢子才受影响。然而,如果早期识别迅速应对,大量炭疽杆菌孢子空气传播扩散的灾难将不会发生。如果未经处理,炭疽的临床进展包括败血症、脑膜炎和死亡。人炭疽暴露后,用抗生素预防治疗,能阻止感染;早期抗生素治疗,也能增加人生存的机会45。早期识别炭疽的生物恐怖攻击,能迅速进行抗菌剂的分配和控制,加强病例检测,强化监测机制。Smallpox天花Smallpox infection occurs after direct, fairly prolonged face-to-face contact with someone infected with variola virus, after direct contact with variola virus in infected bodily fluids, or on contaminated objects, such as bedding and clothing. 46 As a potential biological weapon, transmission of smallpox via person-to-person contact could involve suicides terrorists who used interpersonal transmission dynamics to disseminate the virus.46 Multiple countries could be affected, and these nations would need to work cooperatively to interrupt the transmission dynamics under way. Although antiviral agents have been identified and are being actively assessed in human trials, none has reached the licensure stage. As of today, there is no specific treatment for smallpox, and the only prevention is vaccination. Notably, a worldwide vaccination program that started in the 1950s has all but eradicated the disease. By 1984 the only known stocks of smallpox virus were in two WHO-approved laboratories—one in Atlanta and other in Moscow.47 Destruction of these viral stocks was originally planned for 1987 but postponed to permit further studies on the virus genome. Because the disease has been eliminated, in many parts of the world, routine vaccination no longer occurs. People who received the smallpox vaccine prior to 1980 probably have little to no immunity to smallpox today and in the case of an epidemic would require vaccination. 46 If a bioterrorist event involving smallpox were to occur, early case identification and isolation would be essential, and HCWs would need evidence of vaccination to safely provide care to infected case. Transmission would need to be minimized via targeted vaccination of close contacts of the index cases. Depending on the nature of the attack, a large-scale vaccination might be necessary, in which case public health organizations and other health organizations, such as ambulatory clinics, would have to anticipate and plan for the logistics of vaccinating the entire community.天花感染发生于直接与天花病毒的接触,持续地与感染天花病毒的人面对面的接触,接触了被天花病毒感染的体液或被污染的物品(如床上用品或服装)后46。作为一个潜在的生物武器,天花的传播途径是人与人的接触,包括使用人际间传播动力学方式传播病毒的自杀式恐怖分子46。许多国家受到影响,这些国家必须合作工作打断这一正在进行的传播动力学。抗病毒制剂已经研发出来,正在进行人体试验评估,还没达到应用许可阶段。直到今天,对天花还没有特殊的治疗方法,仅仅是疫苗接种预防。尤其是,从上世纪50年代以来开始的世界范围疫苗接种项目,几乎消除了这一疾病。到1984年,知道仅有的天花病毒株在两个世界卫生组织认定的实验室----一个在亚特兰大,另一个在莫斯科47。起初计划1987年毁灭这些病毒株,但为了将来病毒基因研究延期了。由于这一疾病已经淘汰,在世界许多地方,常规的疫苗接种不再出现。人们接种天花疫苗是在1980年以前,可能到今天极少或没有免疫力,有流行情况必须接种疫苗46。如果生物恐怖事件包括天花发生,必须早期识别情况和隔离,医务人员必须证实已经安全接种疫苗才能去治疗感染者。对查到的病例密切接触者进行疫苗接种,使传播最小化。根据攻击的不同性质,大规模的疫苗接种是必要的,在某种情况,公共卫生机构和其他卫生机构,例如流动诊疗所,要为整个国家的疫苗接种提供后勤保障进行预测和计划。Conclusion小结Infection prevention and control strategies are critical to safe, high-quality health care. Organizations that embrace IPC and implement systems to identify, to address, and to prevent the spread of infections help create health cultures based on safety and organizations rooted in quality. To create such a culture, organizations must continually examine, evaluate, and act on IPC issues and view IPC as an integral component of patient safety and HCW occupation health and safety. Successful strategies to prevent or mitigate infections require ongoing collaboration between the professionals and officials in the public health sector, hospitals, and other health care settings.感染预防控制策略对安全、高效的医疗服务很重要。奉行感染预防控制策略和对识别、控制、预防感染传播进行系统实施的团队,能帮助创建基于安全的健康文化和根植于质量的团队。创建如此的文化和团队,必须不断地调查、评估对把病人安全和医务人员职业健康安全作为一个整体起作用的感染预防控制策略的议题和观点。成功的预防和降低感染的策略必须公共卫生部门、医院和其他医疗服务机构的专业人员和行政官员不断地合作。






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